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Foreword
This Discussion Paper provides a broad overview of the causes, dynamics and 
ramifications of violent conflicts in the Horn of Africa, widely regarded as the 
most conflict-affected sub-region in Africa. It also proffers reasons as to why 
the conflicts will persist for some time. An in-depth analysis of the conflicts in 
Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan and Uganda is undertaken. These conflicts are cat-
egorised as inter-state, intra-state and communal, and the core and contextual 
factors driving them are critically discussed. The conflicts are then critically 
examined from regional, national and local perspectives, providing both a rich 
historical background and an analytical framework for understanding the con-
nections between and specificities of the complex conflicts ravaging the region. 
Emphasis is placed on the roots of the conflict, their interconnectedness and 
their impact on the region and beyond, including regional development. The 
paper then provides insights into the failings of the postcolonial states and how 
fragmentation of institutional systems fed the regional dynamics of violent con-
flict. Other dimensions explored include the crises of regional governance and 
external intervention by global powers intent on pursuing their strategic and 
economic interests in this region. Some attention is then paid to how the institu-
tional and socioeconomic challenges are further complicated by environmental 
degradation, displacement and the refugee problem. The foregoing helps explain 
why none of the eight countries of the Greater Horn area is completely free of 
conflict and its consequences and opens up the discussion about what is needed 
to brighten the prospects for long-term peace. Central to the recommendations 
to this end is the need to address the core and contextual challenges of diversity 
management, nation-building, democratisation and institutional reform at all 
levels. The author also identifies areas for further research as a first step towards 
resolving the conflicts. The two key research issues identified relate to the capac-
ity of the states in the region to reconcile the fragmented and incoherent institu-
tions and systems, and the imperative to contextualise democracy to meet the 
needs and aspirations of local people. This paper is therefore of importance to 
scholars and policy actors with an interest in peace, security and development in 
one of Africa’s most troubled sub-regions. 
Cyril Obi
Senior Researcher
The Nordic Africa Institute
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introduction
The Greater Horn region is one of the most conflict-ravaged areas on the African 
continent.1 The populations of the region have endured many inter-state and 
intra-state armed conflicts during the post-independence era, starting in 1956, 
when Sudan became the first sub-Saharan African country to get its independ-
ence, and the present. The region was by no means peaceful before the era of 
decolonisation. During the period roughly between the early 1800s and the era 
of decolonisation, for example, it experienced many wars, which revolved mostly 
around state formation and empire building; slave raids; control of resources 
and trade routes; colonisation and resistance to colonialism; and the liberation 
struggle. This paper, however, is limited to the postcolonial era.
The region presently consists of seven countries, including Djibouti, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda, which are members of the In-
ter-governmental Authority for Development (IGAD),2 plus Southern Sudan, 
which became independent on 9 July 2011 and is  the latest addition to the 
region. If Somaliland, which has declared its independence from the rest of So-
malia, achieves international recognition as an independent state, the number 
of countries in the region will increase to nine. However, it should be noted that 
the fragmentation of Sudan into north and south is likely to add to the region’s 
instability, as will be explained later. 
Although interconnected, the region’s conflicts occur at several levels, in-
cluding direct inter-state wars and armed conflicts; intra-state civil wars and 
conflicts; and inter-communal conflicts.3 The distinction between wars and 
armed conflicts follows the differentiation drawn by the Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program (UCDP), according to which the former involves casualty figures of 
100 people and higher per year, while the latter involves casualty figures of less 
1.   The Horn of Africa proper is a geographical concept referring to the countries of Djibouti, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia.  The Greater Horn, on the other hand, is largely a political 
concept that incorporates Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda into the Horn region and encompasses 
all the countries of the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD).
2.   At the time of writing, Eritrea had suspended its membership of IGAD due to disagreements 
over IGAD’s support for Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia in 2006 to remove the Islamic 
Courts Union (ICU) from power.  
3.   The divide between inter-state and intra-state conflicts is not always clear, especially in 
cases of contested sovereignty.  It is, for example, unclear whether border clashes between 
Somaliland and Pun land is an inter-state or intra-state conflict.  It was also controversial 
whether Eritrea’s war of independence was an intra-state or an inter-state conflict, since, 
from the point of view of Eritrean nationalists, the war was in reaction to Ethiopia’s illegal 
annexation of their country. For the purposes of this paper, only wars between UN-
recognised sovereign states are referred as inter-state wars.  
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than 100 per year but more than 25.4 Lack of reliable data on casualty figures, 
however, does not always allow strict adherence to this differentiation. 
This study has two principal objectives. One is to examine the factors that 
have contributed to the violent conflicts, paying special attention to those that 
have received little consideration in the existing literature. The second objec-
tive is to explain why the region is likely to remain a major conflict zone un-
less some critical structural and institutional changes are undertaken both at 
national and regional levels. The paper is organised into four sections. The first 
section sketches a conceptual framework for organising the analysis of the com-
plex factors that have engendered the region’s different levels of violent conflict. 
The second part identifies the main conflicts in each of the three categories by 
examining the key factors that have produced them and discussing some of 
their human and material costs. The third section proffers explanations for the 
region’s chronic conflicts and why the conflicts are likely to endure.  In particu-
lar,  the conflict-engendering contextual and core factors driving the violence are 
addressed. The concluding section attempts to identify areas of research that can 
inform the search for peaceful transformation of the region.
Theoretical Framework
The large number of intricately interwoven factors that engender the region’s 
three levels of conflict make it challenging to chart a theoretical framework 
that captures their complexity. The core factors revolve around the nature of 
the postcolonial state and the structures of governance associated with it, both 
at domestic and regional levels. The contextual factors, by contrast, refer to the 
various inherited or externally imposed socioeconomic settings and rapidly dete-
riorating environmental conditions under which the states of the region operate. 
The working proposition is that a combination of core and contextual factors 
produces the conflicts, and bringing peace to the region requires addressing 
both groups of factors at the domestic and regional levels. 
This conceptual anchor allows us to do three things. First, it enables us to ex-
amine (a) the contextual conditions left behind by precolonial empires and the 
colonial state; (b) the conditions and constraints that continue to be imposed 
on the region by the contemporary global system, including the various types of 
external intervention; and (c) the havoc that the rapid environmental degrada-
tion is wreaking on the region. Second, it enables us to explain why the govern-
ments of the region uniformly fail to produce noteworthy success in diversity 
4.   Different data sets, such as the Correlates of War (COW) and International Peace Institute 
in Oslo (PRIO), use different casualty thresholds.
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management, nation-building and in advancing democratic governance, which 
are essential for bringing the conflicts under control. The region’s governments 
have failed in cultivating these conditions, despite differences in their ideologi-
cal persuasions and in their governance systems. The failure of all of them in this 
regard cries out for explanation. Third, it provides an opportunity to address the 
gaps in the literature on the conflicts of the Greater Horn by placing emphasis 
on neglected factors. The literature on the Horn and its conflicts is rather exten-
sive. The impacts of many aspects of the colonial legacy, the predatory nature 
of the state, the unaccountable governance and the ethnocratic and self-serving 
characteristics of the leadership are among the issues that have received exten-
sive coverage. However, the direct and indirect impacts on the region’s conflicts 
of some critical contextual factors, such as the lingering fragmentation of the 
modes of production and institutional systems, are essentially ignored. 
The countries of the Horn, like most other African countries, are character-
ised by fragmented economic and institutional systems. The economic systems 
in the subsistence peasant and pastoral communities and those that the state 
and the modern sector operate under are often incompatible. The institutional 
systems that correspond to the different economic systems are also different. 
Customary land ownership rights and resource allocation mechanisms, as well 
as the systems of adjudication and resolution of conflicts in the two spheres, are 
disharmonious and represent different economic, political and cultural spaces. 
Such fragmentation of the political space exposes the segments of the popula-
tion adhering to traditional economic and institutional systems to economic 
and political marginalisation, as is evident from the disproportionately high 
poverty rates and low access to public service among the peasant and pastoral 
communities. How governance works in such divided socioeconomic spaces is 
a critical question, barely touched in the existing literature. The governments 
of the region have also shown little indication that they have fully grasped the 
constraints on governance imposed by the fragmentation of the socioeconomic 
spaces. They continue to largely ignore customary property rights laws, resource-
allocation mechanisms and conflict-resolution systems when, in most cases, the 
overwhelming majority of their populations are governed by customary institu-
tions.5 To their credit, however, some of the governments are beginning to ad-
dress the issue, albeit in a limited way. The Ethiopian government, for example, 
seems to have realised that its formal system of conflict adjudication is incapable 
of providing adequate service to the population in rural areas and there are signs 
5.   A recent four-country study by Mengisteab, Hagg, et al. (2011) shows that an overwhelming 
majority of survey respondents in rural and peri-urban areas (71.2% in South Africa, 65% 
in Kenya, 59.2% in Somaliland and 78.7% in Ethiopia) take intra-community conflicts to 
traditional institutions instead of to formal courts for settlement. 
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it might be exploring ways of incorporating the traditional (informal) systems 
operating in rural communities. 
It is questionable that traditional conflict-adjudication can be incorporated 
effectively without the incorporation of the customary law on property rights. 
There is also little research to inform policy on how the parallel systems can be 
harmonised. Given the magnitude of the country’s land-based conflicts, Kenya’s 
recently ratified constitution also represents progress in recognising community 
ownership of land. If properly implemented, Article 63 of the constitution af-
firms that communal land belongs to the community, which suggests that cus-
tomary ownership of land will be recognised and protected. This paper’s contri-
bution to the literature lies in its attempt to initiate discussion and research that 
would grapple with the issue of fragmented socioeconomic systems and their 
direct and indirect contribution to the region’s conflicts. 
The region’s Major Wars and conflicts: inter-state Wars and conflicts
The Horn of Africa has experienced more inter-state wars than any other region 
on the continent. It has seen four major inter-state wars and at least three violent 
conflicts in the post-independence era. The major wars were fought primarily 
but not exclusively over territorial and border disputes. Contextual factors have 
played a major role in inter-state wars, since the boundaries of the countries of 
the region were established by precolonial empires (such as the Abyssinian Em-
pire6 in present day Ethiopia and the Mahdiyya state in present day Sudan) and 
the colonial state. The wars over the Ogaden, the Ethiopia-Eritrea war (1960-91) 
and the Southern Sudanese war (1956–72; 1983–2005) cannot be explained 
without reference to their contextual roots, which go back to the precolonial 
empires and the colonial state. However, these wars cannot be fully explained 
by the contextual factors alone, since effective domestic and regional governance 
by the postcolonial state could have managed them without resort to violence.7
6.   The name Abyssinia comes from the term Habesha, which collectively refers to people in 
Ethiopia and Eritrea who speak Semitic languages.  While ancient empires, such as that 
of Axum, may have been built by the Habesha, the Abyssinian Empire usually refers to 
the empire which came into existence in present-day Ethiopia in the early 13th century 
AD.  That empire largely disintegrated into small kingdoms in the 18th century and was 
reconstituted in the mid-19th century and expanded southwards, incorporating large 
groups of non-Habesha populations into the empire. The name of the country was changed 
from Abyssinia to Ethiopia in the aftermath of the Second World War to reflect the new 
demographic composition of the empire.  
7.   It is often argued that border disputes do not lead to war and that it is unaccountable 
governance that causes border wars (see Samatar and Machaka 2006). Our agreement with 
such claim is qualified.  It is true that border disputes do not necessarily lead to wars since 
they can be managed peacefully.  However, since wars often are the failure of politics, 
the same argument can be made about most wars. Non-state actors have also been major 
instigators of inter-state conflicts in the region.  
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 Among the region’s major wars are the three fought between Ethiopia and 
Somalia. The first, over Somalia’s claims to the Somali-inhabited Ogaden re-
gion of Ethiopia, started in 1961, escalated in 1964 and lingered until 1967 
as low intensity conflict. The second Ethiopia-Somalia war, again fought over 
the Ogaden problem, took place between 1977 and 1978 and involved direct 
external intervention, including troops and technical advisors from Cuba and 
the USSR in support of Ethiopia. Defeat in that war largely precipitated the 
collapse of the Somali state in 1991. The third war between the two countries 
occurred between 2006 and 2009. After a decade and half of statelessness, So-
malia appeared to have re-established the state under the Islamic Courts Union 
(ICU), which brought most of Somalia under its control in June 2006. Ethiopia, 
however, viewed the ICU’s Islamist rhetoric and stated aspirations of uniting all 
Somalis under one state as a threat to its stability and territorial integrity. As a 
result, it intervened preemptively to dislodge the ICU from power and to sup-
port the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which had been ineffective 
since its constitution in 2004 in Nairobi as Somalia’s government.8 Ethiopia’s 
invasion was supported by the US, which also had concerns over the ICU’s Is-
lamist rhetoric and viewed some of the ICU’s leaders as having connections with 
Al-Qaida. The head of the council of the ICU, Hassan Dahir Aweys, for exam-
ple, was included on the list of 189 individuals and organisations designated 
terrorist under Executive Order 13224 in the wake of 9/11. 
Ethiopian troops succeeded in removing the ICU from power but could not 
pacify Somalia. The TFG, which rode on the tails of Ethiopian troops to power, 
enjoyed little legitimacy in Somalia. It was widely viewed as a creation of outside 
powers and largely made up of warlords who had divided up the country into 
small fiefs. In the wake of the removal of the ICU from power, a more radical 
Islamist insurgency group, al Shebab, emerged and, along with the remnants of 
the ICU under a new name, Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS), 
continued to fight the TFG and Ethiopian troops. With the latter unable to 
defeat the insurgency and the TFG’s position becoming increasingly untenable, 
the UN brokered negotiations between the TFG and a “moderate” wing of the 
ARS9 (ARS-Djibouti) in Djibouti. The negotiations resulted in agreements to 
form a TFG-ARS unity government and the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops 
from Somalia. The unity government was led by the former chairman of the 
ICU, Sheik Ahmed Sherif, and was formed in December 2009. Like the first 
8.   The TFG replaced a Transitional National Government (TNG), which was formed in Arta, 
Djibouti in 2000.  The TNG was opposed by a coalition called the Somali Restoration and 
Reconciliation Council (SRRC), which was supported by Ethiopia and led by Abdullahi 
Yusuf, who became the president of Somalia under the TFG.
9.   The ARS leadership, which had been in exile in Asmara after being dislodged from power 
by Ethiopian troops, split into a “moderate” wing (ARS-Djibouti) and a “radical” wing 
(ARS-Asmara).  
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TFG, this new government has been rejected by groups who did not participate 
in the negotiations. The al Shebab and the more “radical” wing of the ARS 
(ARS-Asmara), now known as Hizbul Islamiya, led by Sheik Hassan Dahir Aw-
eys, have continued to fight to topple the new government. Despite support 
from AU peacekeepers (AMISOM), diplomatic support from the UN and mili-
tary and diplomatic support from the US, Ethiopia and other regional govern-
ments, Uganda and Kenya in particular, the TFG has been unable to defeat the 
insurgency groups. Like the first TFG, the second TFG remains ineffective and 
owes its existence to external powers. The country’s civil war, however, continues 
to ravage the population. 
The 1998–2000 border war between Ethiopia and Eritrean is perhaps the 
largest war the region has seen in the post-decolonisation era, at least in terms 
of casualty figures. A border dispute in the environs of Badme, a small town on 
the border between southwestern Eritrea and northwestern Ethiopia, escalated 
into a fully fledged war in May 1998. In December 2000, the Algiers Treaty was 
signed ending the war and establishing the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Com-
mission, which was tasked with demarcating the boundary between the two 
countries. On 13 April 2002, the commission gave its ruling, which delineated 
the entire border between the two countries on the basis of colonial treaties. By 
its ruling, the town of Badme, the flashpoint of the war, was placed in Eritrea, 
but Ethiopia, despite reluctantly accepting the commission’s ruling, has yet to 
allow the demarcation of the boundary on the ground. In the absence of such 
progress, the commission declared its task completed after a virtual demarcation 
of the border. However, the border problem remains unsettled, since Ethiopia 
has neither allowed physical demarcation nor accepted the virtual demarcation. 
In addition to the above four major wars, the region has also seen smaller 
inter-state conflicts. The Kenya-Somalia conflict during Kenya’s Shifta wars 
(1963–67) is one such conflict. Uganda and Sudan also experienced armed 
conflicts and tense relations over accusations of support for each other’s rebel 
groups. With the coming to power in Kampala in 1986 of the National Resist-
ance Movement (NRM), which had close ties with the Sudan People’s Libera-
tion Movement (SPLM), Sudan resorted to supporting Uganda’s rebel groups, 
including the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and the Lord’s Resistance Army 
(LRA), in retaliation for Uganda’s alleged support of SPLM. A brief border 
scrimmage between Eritrea and Djibouti in June 2008 is another of the region’s 
inter-state conflicts. At the time of writing, the Eritrea-Djibouti border dispute 
remained unsettled, although a Qatar-led mediation has succeeded in deesca-
lating the conflict and in achieving the withdrawal of Eritrean troops from the 
contested areas. 
Other contentious but currently dormant border issues in the region include 
those between Uganda and Kenya, between Kenya and Sudan over the Elemi 
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triangle and those between Ethiopia and Sudan. These unsettled issues have not 
precipitated violent conflicts yet but future conflicts cannot be entirely ruled 
out. With South Sudan breaking away from the rest of the country, border 
problems between the two Sudans is likely to prove more challenging, especially 
since the contested areas include important sources of oil. 
The countries of the Horn have also fought many proxy wars against each 
other by engaging in what Cliffe (2002:54) calls “mutual interference”, that is, 
support for each other’s insurgency movements. However, since the insurgents 
in most cases are domestic forces, these conflicts are discussed under intra-state 
conflicts. 
intra-state Wars and conflicts 
Every country in the region has faced at least one civil war during the postcolo-
nial era. In most cases, states have fought multiple civil wars, with the parties to 
the conflict the state or militia groups created by the state on the one side and 
sub-state actors, such as ethnic, regional, religious or other political organisa-
tions on the other.10 
The region’s civil wars differ in scope and intensity and many of them are 
closely linked to inter-state conflicts, since in many cases the groups that fight 
against the state either serve as proxies for other states or are supported by them. 
Governments in the Greater Horn have intervened in each other’s internal 
conflicts for a variety of reasons. Some support insurgencies in a neighbouring 
country because of ethnic ties with the rebelling groups. It is also not uncom-
mon for ethnic-based insurgency groups to obtain support from populations of 
neighbouring countries because of ethnic ties, even when they do not obtain 
direct support from governments of those neighbouring countries. Insurgency 
movements in Ethiopia’s Somali-inhabited Ogaden region, such as the Western 
Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF), for example, were supported by the Somali 
state before its collapse in 1991.11 The Shifta wars in Kenya’s Somali-inhabited 
North Eastern Province were also backed by the Somali state, which aspired to 
unite all Somali-inhabited areas in the region under the Somali state. 
In other cases, regimes have supported rebel groups in a neighbouring coun-
try as extensions of their foreign policies, including destabilisation of regimes 
they have antagonistic relations with. Ethiopia and Kenya responded to what 
they perceived as a Somali threat to their national integrity by establishing a 
10.   Civil wars are distinguished from one-sided wars, which are wars states wage against 
political opponents, by the casualty figures the non-state side is able to inflict on the forces 
of the state.  The threshold is usually 100 deaths per year (see Cramer 2006).
11.   The Ogaden is now part of the Somali state (Zone 5) of the Ethiopian federal state.
14
K i d a n e  M e n g i s t e a b
mutual defence pact in 1964. Moreover, successive Ethiopian regimes countered 
Somalia’s support for irredentist movements by aiding insurgency movements 
such as the Somali National Movement (SNM) and Somali Salvation Demo-
cratic Front (SSDF) against the Somali state to weaken its ability to pursue its 
claims over the Ogaden. As noted above (see footnote 8), in the early 2000s 
Ethiopia supported the Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council (SRRC) 
against the Transitional National Government. Presently Ethiopia supports the 
TFG against the al Shebab-Hizbul Islamiya insurrection.
Sudan supported Eritrea’s liberation movements, the People’s Liberation 
Front (EPLF) and the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). It also supported the 
Tigray People’s Liberation Front against the regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam 
of Ethiopia. Ethiopia, for its part, supported the SPLM against successive Su-
danese regimes. Uganda also supported the SPLM while Sudan reciprocated by 
supporting Uganda’s LRA and other Ugandan rebel groups. Sudan supported 
the Eritrean Islamic Jihad in 1993–94 and Eritrea reciprocated by supporting 
Sudan’s opposition groups, the National Democratic Alliance (Kibreab 2009). 
Eritrea currently is said to support various Ethiopian insurgency groups against 
the Ethiopian regime, while the Ethiopian regime retaliates by supporting Eri-
trean opposition groups, including the Eritrean Democratic Alliance and other 
smaller groups, such as the Red Sea Afar Democratic Organisation (RSADO). 
Eritrea is also accused by the UN Security Council, the US government, the 
African Union and IGAD of supporting Somali insurgency groups against the 
TFG as an extension of its conflict with Ethiopia, although little evidence has 
been disclosed on Eritrea’s military support to the Somali insurgency. Some 
analysts, such as the International Crisis Group, for example, dismiss the alleged 
links between Eritrea and the Somali insurgent group al Shebab (Onyiego 2010). 
The civil wars in the region are not simply products of proxy engagements by 
other states, however. Despite their engagement in such wars against each other, 
the region’s regimes have also cooperated in curbing the activities of each other’s 
insurgencies. Emperor Haile Selassie’s Ethiopia, for example, agreed not to sup-
port the SPLM in return for Sudan’s pledge not to support Eritrea’s liberation 
movements (Kibreab 2009). Before their border war, Ethiopia and Eritrea also 
cooperated against rebel groups in Ethiopia’s Afar region. Sudan and Eritrea 
have presently stopped supporting each other’s rebels. Southern Sudan has also 
cooperated with Uganda against the LRA. 
Many of the civil wars are triggered by domestic factors, such as problems of 
diversity management and nation-building, including the real or perceived un-
even development and ethnocratic characteristics of the state, even though some 
form of external intervention might be involved. Others are reactions to repres-
sive rule and ineffective governance, while yet others are triggered by intra-elite 
power struggles. As Deng (1995) notes, intra-elite rivalry often leads to inter-
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ethnic rivalries. A few were triggered by ideological disputes. The Ethiopian 
People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP), a leftist organisation, which fought the 
military government in the late 1970s, is an example. 
The collapse of the Somali state in 1991 resulted, at least in part, from the 
country’s civil wars. Since the collapse, the country has endured wars among 
various warlords, 1991–2006; in Puntland against the fragile state of Somalia, 
2004; ICU vs. The Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism 
(ARPCT), 2006; TFG vs. ICU, 2005–06; TFG against the al Shebab and Hiz-
bul Islamiya, 2009-present.
Sudan has perhaps faced the most deadly civil wars in terms of casualty 
figures. Among Sudan’s most important wars are the North-South war of 1955–
72; the North-South war of 1983–2005; the Darfur Conflict, 2003–present; 
the Beja Congress and the Rashaida Free Lions of the East; and rebellion of the 
Nuba mountain region.
Ethiopia has encountered the greatest number of civil-wars in the region. 
Among the most prominent are those against the Eritrea liberation movements, 
1961–91; the Tigrai People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), 1975–91; the Western 
Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), 1974–78; the Oromo Liberation Front, 1975–
present; the Afar Liberation Front, 1975–97; and the Ogaden National Libera-
tion Front, 1984–present. There have also been many other smaller liberation 
fronts that operated against the state at one time or another, including one of the 
few ideologically based conflicts, that involving the EPRP, 1975–77.
Kenya has faced relatively fewer wars, although it has not been immune 
to the factors that have engendered such conflicts, as is evident from the 1992 
violence which led to approximately 2,000 deaths and 500,000 displaced per-
sons (APRM Kenya 2006). The 2007 post-election violence that rocked the 
country resulted in the death of about 1,300 people and the displacement of 
over 600,000. The government of the People’s Rally for Progress in Djibouti has 
also faced insurgency from an Afar organisation, The Front for the Restoration 
of Unity and Democracy (FRUD), 1991–94. FRUD continued to engage in low 
intensity conflict between 1994 and 2001. Uganda also has faced a number of 
civil wars waged by various armed groups. Among them are the Buganda war 
of 1966; the wars during the regime of Idi Amin (1972–79); the wars waged by 
the Ugandan National Rescue Front against the Obote government, 1980–85; 
the National Resistance Army, 1982-86; the Uganda Peoples Democratic Army 
(UPDA), 1986–88; the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), 1996–present; and 
the LRA, which emerged in 1987. The war against the LRA continues to desta-
bilise the country. 
Like the inter-state wars, the civil wars also have both contextual and core 
factors. Precolonial empires and the colonial state left behind ethnic identities 
fragmented in several states, fragmented economic and institutional systems and 
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uneven socioeconomic development among regions and ethnic groups. These 
conditions have made diversity management and nation-building difficult. As 
will be explained in the next section, the postcolonial state and regional govern-
ance have done little to correct the inherited legacies and have often exacerbated 
the problems.
inter-communal conflicts
In addition to civil wars, Horn countries have faced many inter-communal 
armed conflicts. These are often fought between ethnic and clan groups over 
resources such as land, water and even livestock. While not limited to pasto-
ralists, these conflicts tend to affect such communities disproportionately. In 
some cases, governments aggravate the conflicts by interfering on one side or the 
other, as the cases of Darfur in Sudan and Gambella in Ethiopia show. If certain 
identity groups engage in rebellion or resist policy measures, governments tend 
to intervene in communal conflicts by supporting rival identity groups. In other 
cases, inter-communal competition over resources may intensify into deadly 
conflicts, due to government inability to address such conflicts in a timely man-
ner. Countless inter-communal conflicts, which have often intensified with the 
availability of small arms, have contributed to instability and economic disrup-
tions in the region. Undoubtedly, these conflicts are sporadic and of much lower 
intensity than inter-state and civil wars. Yet because of their frequency, they are 
highly destructive. South Sudan’s inter-communal conflicts in Jonglei area, for 
example, are estimated to have resulted in over 2,500 deaths and the displace-
ment of some 350,000 people in 2009 alone (BBC News online, 22 January 
2010). Ethiopia’s inter-communal conflicts include those between: Afar-Issa 
identities (2002); Afar-Kereyou (2002–03); Amaro-Guji (2006); Anuak-Dinka 
(2002); Anuak-Nuer (2002–03); Bi’idyahan-Ismail (2003); Borana-Guji (2006); 
Borana-Konso (2008); Burji-Guji (2006); Dawa-Gura, (2003); Derashe-Konso 
(2008); Dizi-Surma (2002); Gabra-Guji (2005); Gumuz-Oromo (2008); Ma-
jerteen-Ogaden (2004); Marehan-Majerteen (2006); Merille-Turkana (2005); 
Murle-Nuer (2006); Nyangatom, Toposa-Turkana (2006); Ogaden-Sheikal 
(2002); and Oromo-Somali. 
Kenya’s inter-communal conflicts include: Borana-Gabra (2005); Dongiro-
Turkana (2006); Garre-Murle (2005, 2008); Kalenjin-Kikuyu (2008); Kalenjin-
Kisii (2008); Luo-Kikuyu (2008); Nyangatom-Turkana (2008); Pokot-Turkana 
(2006, 2008); and Topsa-Turkana (2008). Among Sudan’s inter-communal con-
flicts are: Aqar (Dinka)-Aqok (Dinka) (2006); Ereigat Abbala Arabs-Zaghawa 
(2002); Habaniya-Falata (2007); Habaniya-Rizeigat Baggara (2006); Hotiya Bag-
gara-Newiba, Mahariba and Mahamid (2005); Missiriya-Rizeigat Baggara (2008); 
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Murle-Bor Dinka (2007); Murle-Nuer Lou (2006); Nuer Lou-Hol Dinka (2008); 
Rizeigat Baggara-Ma’aliyah (2002, 2004); Terjam-Rizeigat Abbala (2007); Topo-
sa-Didinga (2007); and between the Zaghawa and Ma’aliya (2008). Somalia and 
Uganda have also had a sizeable number of inter-communal conflicts. 
Human and Material costs of the Wars 
Estimates of casualty figures from the various post-independence wars and 
armed conflicts of the region are highly unreliable and in some cases non-exist-
ent. From anecdotal estimates, however, the direct and indirect casualty figures 
are frighteningly high. Casualty figures from Sudan’s first North-South conflict 
(1955–72) are put at 500,000.12 The second North-South civil war of the Sudan 
(1983–2005) is said to have produced some 2 million dead, 420,000 refugees and 
over 4 million displaced. According to various estimates, the casualty figures for 
the Darfur conflict are estimated at over 180,000, with roughly 2 million people 
displaced. Human rights organisations estimate the Darfur casualty figures to 
be over 300,000 deaths (Qugnivet 2006).13 Eritrea’s casualties from its war of 
independence (1961–91) are estimated to be around 50,000. Casualty figures for 
Ethiopia’s various wars between 1962 and 1992 are estimated at about 1.4 mil-
lion (Twentieth Century Atlas, not dated). The Ethiopian-Eritrean border war 
of 1998–2000 is estimated to have claimed between 70,000 and 120,000 lives 
and resulted in the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people. Estimated 
casualty figures for the Ogaden war between Ethiopia and Somalia (1996–98) 
exceed 31,000, while the estimates for the ongoing Somali civil wars since 1991 
range between 300,000 and 400,000. Indeed, since the start of 2007 alone, 
Somalia’s civil wars are believed to have led to 18,000 deaths and the displace-
ment of over 1.4 million people, while Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia in 2006 
resulted in over 8,500 deaths. Uganda’s conflict with Buganda in 1966 is said to 
have left 2,000 dead and the wars in Uganda during Idi Amin’s rule (1972–79) 
produced some 300,000 deaths. A similar number died during Uganda’s civil 
wars (1979–86), with roughly 750,000 people displaced, and the country’s con-
flicts against the LRA since 1987 are said to have cost between 2,000 and 5,000 
deaths. As noted above, Kenya’s 2007 post-election violence led to the deaths of 
roughly 1,300 people. No doubt, the various inter-communal conflicts continue 
to add to the casualty figures. 
12. The estimates of casualty figures are extracted from the various estimates compiled in the 
Twentieth Century Atlas-Death Tolls and Casualty Statistics for Secondary Wars and 
Atrocities, http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstat3.htm 
13.  The government of Sudan strongly disagrees with this estimate of casualties. Its own 
estimate is in the tens of thousands only.
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The conflicts have also made the region one of the largest sources of refugees 
in the world, estimated in 2008 at 1,248,565, with about 8.5 million internally 
displaced (World Bank 2008; UNDP 2008). In addition, the region’s conflicts 
have led to gross human rights abuses. The region’s governments are often ac-
cused by human rights organisations of atrocities against citizens including dis-
appearances, torture, incarceration of political opponents and journalists with-
out due process of law, intimidation of candidates of opposition parties, as well 
as rigging elections (see various reports from Amnesty International; Human 
Rights Watch; Reporters without Borders).
The economic costs of the various wars and conflicts are also likely to be huge 
given the massive destruction of property and profound socioeconomic disrup-
tions. Some view the conflicts as the single greatest barrier to the region’s socio-
economic development (Mwaura, Baechler and Kiplagat 2002). Unfortunately, 
few comprehensive estimates of the economic costs of the wars exist. Anecdotal 
evidence gives us some indication, however. The border war with Eritrea is, for 
example, said to have cost Ethiopia over $2.5 billion, while estimates of the costs 
for Eritrea range from $500 million to $1.5 billion. Uganda also puts its war costs 
over the 1986–2002 period at $1.33 billion, roughly 3 per cent of its GDP (APRM 
Uganda Report 2009). There are estimates of military expenditures as a ratio of 
gross domestic product, which give us some indication of changes in expenditure 
during periods of major war and periods of relative stability. However, they pro-
vide little information on the actual costs of all three levels of the conflicts, espe-
cially the economic costs to civilian populations. Similarly, military expenditures 
as a ratio of total public expenditures (Table 1) only give us a partial picture, since 
they do not reflect direct and indirect costs of the conflicts to the general popula-
tion. It is, however, safe to assume that the costs of the various conflicts are large 
enough to make notable differences to the region’s development.
Table 1. Military expenditures as a ratio of total public expenditures
country Djibouti eritrea ethiopia Kenya somalia sudan uganda
% of government 
expenditure allocated to 
Health (1998–2007)
na na 1 7 1 1 2
% of government 
expenditure allocated to 
education (1998–2007)
na na 5 26 2 8 15
% of government 
expenditure allocated to 
Defence (1998–2007)
13.6*
1995–
2005
34.88*
1995–
2003
17 6 38 28 26
*Source: us state Department. World Military expenditures and arms Transfers, 1995–2005. Source: uniceF, 
information by country March, 2010. http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/
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Factors in the Wars and conflicts
As noted above, the factors that generate the Horn’s conflicts are many and 
complex. This section elaborates on a combination of the contextual and core 
factors that account for the conflicts. We first deal with the contextual factors, 
which can be viewed as having three dimensions. One dimension relates to the 
socioeconomic structures and institutional systems left behind by precolonial 
empires and the colonial state. The second refers to the ongoing influences by 
the global system, including economic, political and military interventions by 
external powers. The third aspect refers to the rapidly deteriorating environ-
mental conditions, which along with rapid population growth have generated 
scarcity of resources and conflicts among communities. The core factors refer to 
the nature of the postcolonial state and its governance systems. This factor also 
has two dimensions, including domestic governance and regional governance. 
We first examine each of the three dimensions of the contextual factors. 
Legacies of Precolonial empires and the colonial state
A number of developments and socioeconomic arrangements and inter-identity 
power relations left behind by precolonial empires and the colonial state have 
become critical sources of conflict in the postcolonial era. Two notable precolo-
nial empires in the region were the Abyssinian Empire and the Mahdiyya state 
in the Sudan. Both empires left behind imprints that still contribute to con-
flicts in the region. The Abyssinian Empire is credited with creating the modern 
Ethiopian state through expansionist conquests during the second half of the 
19th century and defence against European colonialism. However, it also left 
behind inter-state boundary problems and deep disparities in citizenship rights 
within the country. The populations in the newly incorporated southern parts of 
the country were ravaged by slave raids, looting and, in many cases, large-scale 
land expropriations during and in the aftermath of their incorporation into the 
empire. Those who lost their land were reduced to landless tenants, who tilled 
the land for northern landlords (Pankhurst 1968).14 The Empire also established 
a hierarchy of cultures, non-Abyssinian cultures in the newly incorporated terri-
tories being placed in a subordinate position. Some of the legacies of the Empire, 
like the landlessness created by land expropriation, have largely been reversed by 
the 1975 land reform. The cultural inequalities have also been mitigated with 
14.   The Abyssinian Empire played a double role in the slave trade. It curtailed the slave trade by 
the Oromo kingdoms, which it conquered in the late 1880s, giving relief to the victims of 
those kingdoms in the southern parts of the country.  At the same time, however, it engaged 
in the slave trade itself.
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the institution of a federal system in the country’s 1994 constitution. However, 
disparities in access to political and economic power remain important sourc-
es of conflict, as is evident from the activities of the Oromo Liberation Front 
and the Ogaden National Liberation Front. Similarly, Sudan’s Mahdiyya state, 
which professed Arab identity and was supported by slave-raiding communi-
ties, left behind complex scars in inter-identity relations, particularly between 
northern and southern identity groups, which have led the country to the brink 
of disintegration (Deng 2010).
The conflict-fostering legacies of precolonial empires were compounded by 
the structural and institutional mechanisms established by the colonial state. 
Four critical conflict-fomenting legacies of the latter can be identified. One is 
the division of various ethnic groups among a number of states. State bounda-
ries often are arbitrary and few states in the world are made up of single ethnic 
groups. The degree of arbitrariness of boundaries and the resulting fragmenta-
tion of ethnic groups, however, seems disproportionately high in Africa, where 
states are mostly colonial creations. Table 2 provides a list of some of the ethnic 
groups spread across several states in the Greater Horn region. Often, the frag-
mentation of ethnic groups involves not only disruption of social and cultural 
ties but also of economic process, by hindering the movement of communities, 
which rely on regional ecosystems for survival, as Samatar (2006) notes. While 
the fragmentation of the Somali people, which led to three major wars between 
Ethiopia and Somalia, is the most conspicuous problem, many of the other frag-
mented ethnic groups have had problems with their states (see Table 2).15 Frag-
mentation of ethnic groups raises citizenship and identity problems and in many 
cases has also led to the marginalisation of those groups.
A second legacy of colonialism is the problem of boundaries and in some 
cases territories. In many instances colonial boundaries are not demarcated on 
the ground or even clearly delineated. This vagueness has caused a number of 
border disputes. The Eritrea-Ethiopia border war was the greatest of these, but 
border disputes are rampant. As noted in the preceding section, every country in 
the region has border disputes with at least two of its neighbours. A border prob-
lem is likely to arise between north and South Sudan. Although the British kept 
South Sudan apart from the north for most of the colonial period, the bounda-
ries between the two remain unclear and are likely to be challenging. Border 
conflicts are mostly inter-state conflicts, but also have serious implications for 
state-identity and inter-identity relations, as they entail various hardships for 
border communities, especially when their loyalty to their states is questioned. 
The Misseriya and Dinka Ngok identities in Sudan’s Abyei region, for example, 
15.   The claim here is not that ethnic fragmentation by itself is a sufficient condition to lead to 
conflicts. Rather, it is that fragmentation often exposes groups to marginalisation, which, 
in turn, propels them to resist. 
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are likely to have conflicting positions on South Sudan’s independence and on 
whether Abyei forms part of the north or the south.
Another legacy of colonialism is the uneven development among regions and 
ethnic groups within countries. One of the key objectives of colonialism was the 
extraction of resources. Areas rich in mineral resources and those with fertile 
land in accessible locations were targets for investment, while areas deemed not 
profitable were generally marginalised. The Buganda areas of southern Uganda 
were privileged relative to the rest of the country (Mutibwa 2008). In Kenya 
also the British identified central Kenya and the Rift Valley area as profitable, 
while the western and northeastern regions, viewed as unprofitable and trouble-
some, were marginalised (APRM Kenya Report 2006; Mwaura, Baechler and 
Kiplagat 2002). Southern Sudan and northern Uganda were among other areas 
relatively marginalised by the colonial state.16 All these areas remain marginal-
ised and they have become centres of conflict.
A fourth legacy of colonialism, largely absent from the literature but difficult 
to overcome, is the fragmentation of modes of production and the correspond-
ing institutions of governance. The colonial state created a small modern capital-
16.  There are widespread arguments that ethnic conflicts are essentially caused by an 
entrepreneurial elite that mobilises ethnic groups to further its own political interests. 
These arguments, however, tend to overstate the case. In many cases, ethnic groups rebel 
against the state because they face marginalisation.  In such cases, the conflict cannot be 
simply attributed to political entrepreneurs.
Table 2. A selected list of ethnic groups that are spread across different countries 
name of ethnic Groups countries of Habitation occurrences 
of conflict
afar Djibouti*, eritrea, ethiopia* Yes
somali somalia*, Djibouti*, ethiopia*, 
Kenya*
Yes
Luo Kenya*, uganda, sudan*, ethiopia, 
Tanzania
Yes
Luhya Kenya, uganda, Tanzania no
Beja, rashaida, Tigre eritrea and sudan* Yes (Beja)
Tigrigna, Kunama, shaho (irob) eritrea* and ethiopia* Yes
oromo ethiopia* and Kenya Yes
Pokot and Teso Kenya and uganda no
Kakwa, sebei, Lugbwara, Madi, ancholi, 
Kaliko, Pojullo
uganda* and south sudan* Yes
anuak, nuer, Bertha, Donyiro, Tirma,  
shita, Gumuz, Murle, Kichepo, Wetawit
ethiopia* and sudan* Yes
Daasanach ethiopia, Kenya and sudan no
*countries where the conflicts have occurred.
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ist economic sector and introduced its own institutions of governance without 
replacing indigenous institutions. It also did not create organic links between 
the two sectors such that the new sector facilitates the transformation of the tra-
ditional. Instead, it established an incoherent political economy with parallel if 
largely incompatible systems. As noted already, the parallel modes of production 
and institutional systems represent different socioeconomic spaces, and making 
policy that advances the interests of both has become extremely challenging. 
Policy is, thus, generally geared towards the modern system, marginalising the 
traditional sector and the population that operates under it. 
The economic marginalisation of rural inhabitants, along with the institu-
tional detachment of the state from this large segment of the population, has in 
many cases adversely affected the legitimacy of the state and state-society rela-
tions. Often, the marginalisation of rural inhabitants affects some ethnic (and 
other identity) groups more than others. Geography seems to play some role in 
this regard. The further an ethnic group is from urban centres, the more it relies 
on traditional institutions and the more limited its access to public services. In 
any case, inequalities frequently lead to problems of diversity management and 
ethnic conflict, which often exacerbate the inequalities and undermine the pro-
cess of nation-building. 
Postcolonial Global environment
The global environment in the postcolonial era has also contributed to the re-
gion’s inter-state and intra-state conflicts, although external intervention has 
also been life-saving, especially during calamities. The ideology and politics of 
the Cold War, for example, had a significant influence on the Eritrea-Ethiopia 
conflict (1961-91). US strategic interests in general and its interest in inheriting 
a communications base left behind by Italy following the fall of its East Africa 
empire in 1941 was one of the factors that led to the ill-fated federation of Eri-
trea with Ethiopia (Okubazghi Yohannes 1991). The intensity of the Ethiopia-
Somalia conflicts was also exacerbated by the rivalry of the superpowers in arm-
ing the two countries. The imposition of structural adjustment programmes 
through the conditionalities of the IMF and the World Bank represented an-
other intervention that intensified social inequalities and the rift between the 
modern and traditional economic sectors. The post-September 11 War on Terror 
is another factor that has divided the countries of the region into different camps 
and facilitated external intervention in Somalia’s civil wars. External support 
to regimes who profess to be partners in the War on Terror, despite their poor 
record on human rights and democratisation, also seems to be worsening state-
society relations. 
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Massive environmental Degradation 
Another contextual factor that has contributed to the conflicts and instability 
of the region is the alarming rate of environmental degradation it has faced. 
Much of the region is arid or semi-arid and has over the last five or so decades 
faced rapid environmental degradation, manifested in frequent droughts and 
chronic food and water shortages. Global climate changes and various human 
activities, including rapid population growth, changes in land-use patterns and 
chronic conflict, have contributed to the environmental degradation, which has 
culminated in economic and social dislocation, displacement and widespread 
resource-based conflicts. Deteriorating environmental conditions have exerted 
increasing pressure on the region’s populations, especially peasants and nomads, 
and have resulted in land and water-based communal conflicts. While Darfur is 
the most obvious case, many of the communal conflicts identified in this paper’s 
second section are impacted by scarcity of resources caused by environmental 
degradation.
Table 3. Droughts in the Horn of Africa, 1980–2010
Djibouti eritrea ethiopia Kenya somalia sudan uganda
Total number of droughts 
1980–2008
6.0 3.0 8.0 9.0 8.0 0.7 0.6
average number of 
droughts/year1980–2008
0.28 0.19 0.28 0.33 0.28 0.25 0.22
Source: eM-DaT, The international Disaster Database, http://www.emdat.be/result-country-profile
nature and Failure of the Postcolonial state
The contextual factors represent the conditions under which the postcolonial 
state has to operate. No doubt, they pose serious challenges for the region’s 
governance and peaceful socioeconomic development. However, they don’t nec-
essarily determine outcomes, since the postcolonial state and regional intergov-
ernmental organisations can remove the obstructive conditions and transform 
the context. Unfortunately, the postcolonial state in the Horn, like the state on 
the rest of the continent, has not transformed the context. 
Two types of failures characterise the state. One failure relates to the self-
serving behaviour of most leaders and other functionaries of the state. Given 
the weakness of the political systems, leaders are often able to subordinate broad 
social interests to their own private interests, including monopolising political 
power. Often they also become ethnocratic, as Ali Mazrui (1975) notes, or they 
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are perceived as such by large segments of the population, since they tend to rely 
on ethnic affiliations to secure their power. In some cases, such self-serving lead-
ers may even perpetuate wars and ethnic/clan conflicts when they find them to 
be instrumental in extending their hold on power. Somalia’s Siad Barre is one 
leader who resorted to clan politics as the legitimacy of his government waned. 
During the dying years of his rule, Mengistu Haile Mariam also attempted 
to portray the insurgency in Eritrea and Tigray as an ethnic (Tigray/Tigrigni) 
drive for power. Such states can hardly be expected to transform the context and 
bring about the regime’s peaceful transformation.
The second and more general failure relates to lack of understanding of the 
nature of the contextual impediments and/or inability to transform them. The 
legacies of precolonial empires and colonial state, thus, remain largely intact. 
The fragmented ethnic groups in the region have seen little by way of arrange-
ments that would help alleviate their burden. The region’s ethnic groups, vic-
tims of uneven development under colonialism, continue to bear the burden of 
uneven development and marginalisation. Eastern and southeastern Ethiopia, 
southern and western Sudan, northern Uganda and western and northeastern 
Kenya are the most obvious examples. The postcolonial state also continues to 
operate on the basis of imported institutions and is largely oblivious to the insti-
tutions adhered to by most of its population. Efforts at transforming traditional 
modes of production and thereby at harmonising the fragmented modes of pro-
duction have also been grossly inadequate. Under the prevailing institutional 
and economic fragmentation, neither nation-building nor viable democratisa-
tion is feasible. No doubt the countries of the region, with the exception of Eri-
trea and Somalia, conduct elections. Yet elections, in most cases, do not lead to 
changes of leader or government. The current leaders of four of the countries of 
the region have, for instance, been in power for almost two decades. In Uganda, 
the regime has been in power for 24 years, in Sudan 21 years and in Ethiopia 
and Eritrea, for 20 years. More importantly, elections hardly represent the seg-
ments of the population that live under the traditional modes of production and 
institutional systems. Rural inhabitants, of course, participate in elections but 
there is little to suggest that the pool of candidates they choose from represents 
their interests or even that rural people vote for candidates on the basis of their 
own interests. 
Failure to transform the context by bridging the institutional divide explains 
why African governments fail in diversity management and nation-building and 
democratisation, despite differences in quality of leadership and types of govern-
ment. In other words, the region’s governments, regardless of their ideological 
orientation or even levels of commitment to national development, operate un-
der imported institutional systems that detach the state from its populations. 
Despite the glaring institutional incoherence, there has been little effort to con-
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textualise the institutions of democracy even when the rhetoric of democracy is 
on the rise. 
Failure of regional Governance
The failure of the region’s states in transforming their socioeconomic structures 
and institutional systems is compounded by the failure of regional and conti-
nental intergovernmental organisations. The countries of the Greater Horn are 
members of IGAD, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COME-
SA), as well as the African Union. Yet none of these intergovernmental bodies 
has been effective in reducing the conflicts of the region. Although the continent 
is replete with border disputes, intergovernmental organisations, including the 
African Union, have yet to develop effective mechanisms for settling boundary 
disputes before they escalate into war. 
These organisations have also not been able to develop mechanisms that 
would ease the challenge of fragmented ethnic identities. Somalia’s attempts 
to redraw its colonial boundaries in order to unite all Somalis under one state 
received little support from other African states or the Organisation of African 
Unity (OAU) in the early 1960s. The OAU decided that colonial boundaries are 
sacrosanct since tampering with them was likely to open a Pandora’s Box and 
lead to wars all over the continent.17 Undoubtedly, redrawing colonial bounda-
ries would be risky. However, the OAU and AU have not instituted mechanisms 
that would allow populations divided by national boundaries to maintain their 
economic and cultural ties with each other though flexible borders. Further-
more, despite the numerous conflicts the region as well as the continent face, the 
regional organisations as well as the African Union have yet to establish effective 
conflict-resolution mechanisms. Is seems the resolution of African conflicts is 
often outsourced to actors outside the continent. 
Possible changes and areas of research
The foregoing discussion suggests that bringing the region’s conflicts under con-
trol requires bold and fundamental change. The border conflicts that lead to 
inter-state wars and conflicts can be dealt with through effective and proactive 
measures by regional organisations. However, to become effective a regional 
17.   The AU’s policy with regard to colonial boundaries has remained intact so far.  Eritrea’s 
independence did not contravene the AU’s policy since Eritrea was a colonial creation. 
Southern Sudan’s independence, when it materialises, will be the real change to the AU’s 
longstanding policy. 
26
K i d a n e  M e n g i s t e a b
organisation such as IGAD would require a level of independence from mem-
ber states as well as external powers so that it could operate as a neutral body. 
Moreover, since intra-state and inter-state conflicts are closely intertwined, the 
organisation would need to deal with both. 
Regional organisations also need to chart innovative arrangements that 
would alleviate the burden of fragmented ethnic groups. This would require 
advances in the regional integration agenda so that borders are open to allow 
divided populations to maintain full social, cultural and economic interactions 
with their identity groups across borders with little hindrance. The success of 
regional integration schemes is, therefore, imperative not only for economic de-
velopment but for internal and regional peace and stability.
Perhaps the most challenging problem the region faces is transforming the 
nature of the state. Much emphasis has been placed on democratisation as criti-
cal to changing the nature of the state and allowing effective management of 
diversity and nation-building in the region. There is little doubt that peaceful 
management of diversity and nation-building is unlikely to succeed without 
democratic governance. However, democratisation also requires reconciliation 
of the fragmented institutions and integration of the fragmented modes of pro-
duction. Effective democratic governance under conditions of fragmented and 
incoherent institutional systems is hardly conceivable. Institutional reconcili-
ation, in turn, implies contextualisation of democracy to ensure it reflects lo-
cal realities and becomes relevant to the population under both institutional 
systems. Without institutional transformation, current democratic efforts lack 
the foundations to develop into genuine democratic systems that bring the mar-
ginalised segments of society into the political process. 
Unfortunately, there has not been much effort towards structural and insti-
tutional transformation in the region, without which the region, sadly, is like-
ly to remain conflict-prone for the foreseeable future. There has also not been 
much research undertaken into how the state can reconcile the fragmented and 
incoherent institutional systems. Another area where research is in acute need 
is on how democratic institutions can be contextualised so that the people that 
live under different modes of production and institutional systems can become 
stakeholders in the democratisation struggle. 
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